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I. INTRODUCTION
Mary, a thirty-four-year-old single mother, spends all day and half
the night working her two minimum wage jobs to provide for her
fourteen-year-old son, Stephen, and her three-year-old daughter,
Danielle. Ever since their father was killed a year ago, Mary has had to
pick up the slack. She comes home and gets four hours of sleep per night
in their Section 8 housing that she got with the voucher the government
gave her. She cannot do it all herself; she needs Stephen to step up and
help take care of little Dani. Stephen has for the last year. Although
Stephen has taken responsibility for the last year, Mary knows that she
cannot force Stephen to be a parent at fourteen; Stephen has to be able to
still do fourteen-year-old things too.
It is winter break during Stephen’s freshman year of high school.
Dani is still in preschool/daycare during the break some days. Stephen
has taken to wanting to stay the night at his friends’ houses recently and
did so last night. This morning Stephen was still at his friend’s’ house, so
Mary had to get up a little earlier to get Dani ready. After sleeping
through two of her alarms and only getting three and a half hours of
sleep, Mary barely has enough time to get Dani prepared for daycare.
With her tired, bloodshot eyes, Mary drops off a messy, sick, Dani
without her lunch, her hair brushed, or a jacket. The teacher hears Dani
mention to another student that “her mommy forgot to take her to her
doctor’s appointment yesterday.”
As a mandatory reporter, the teacher of the preschool called Child
Protective Services (“CPS”). The social worker assigned to the case
begins to investigate. The social worker comes while Stephen is at his
friend’s home for a couple of days and notices that the mother is never
home, lives in a rough area with her two children, and the house is an
absolute mess. The social worker files a dependency petition with the
superior court and takes Dani into protective custody. Twenty-four hours
later, at the initial hearing, the mother tells her story, but the problem is
that she has admitted that she cannot care for the child on her own and
that she has no immediate family. The court decides to detain Dani,
meaning she is removed from Mary’s custody and placed in a temporary
home.
Fifteen days later, the court holds the mandatory jurisdictional
hearing and finds under subdivision (b) of the California Welfare and
Institution Code section 300 that Dani is a dependent within the
jurisdiction of the court. The court can obtain jurisdiction over Dani
under subdivision (b) due to Mary’s negligent failure to provide Dani
with adequate clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. Because the court
detained Dani, the disposition hearing must occur within ten days, but

80

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

ten days is not enough time for Mary to have changed the situation
whatsoever.
Six months comes and goes, and Mary is treading water paying for
the housing, paying for meals, giving Stephen his allowance, trying to
get the house clean, and taking a few shifts off per month to get to her
visitation times with Dani. At the Six-Month Review Hearing, Dani
continues to be detained because the court is not convinced by a
preponderance standard that enough has changed to dispel the concern
that Dani is at risk.
Six more months pass by. Mary has managed to trade her day-job
for another job with growth potential. The judge likes the improvement,
but nothing has really changed in regard to her ability to care for Dani.
At the twelve-month review hearing, Dani remains in custody, but the
court decides to continue the permanency hearing until the eighteenmonth point because there is a chance Mary could regain custody.
Six months later—eighteen months after the disposition hearing
where the judge ruled Dani must be taken into custody as a dependent—
parental rights are at issue. Mary got promoted at her new job, but it has
not been long enough for her to afford to quit her late-shift, minimumwage job. This is Mary’s last chance to show the court that her parental
rights should not be terminated. Stephen attends the hearing and tells the
judge how much he stepped up in the past to help take care of Dani.
Mary’s attorney argues that this is the exact case where the sibling
exception to the termination of parental rights under California’s Welfare
and Institution Code section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) applies. If the attorney
can show this exception applies to Dani, she will be returned to Mary
rather than Mary’s parental rights being terminated. To show how this
exception applies, the attorney must prove several things to the judge.
First, there must be a significant sibling bond between Dani and Stephen.
Second, the termination of parental rights must substantially interfere
with that sibling relationship. Third, that substantial interference with the
sibling relationship must cause detriment to the dependent child. Finally,
if the judge decides that the detriment due to the separation from the
sibling outweighs the benefits that the dependent child would receive
from the permanency of adoption, then the exception applies.
Mary’s attorney puts Dani up on the stand who tells the judge how
much she loves Stephen, that she will be sad if she doesn’t go home with
Stephen, how Stephen is the one who taught her to tie her shoes, how
Stephen is the one who taught her how to make cereal, how Stephen is
the one who walks her to daycare and watches Saturday morning
cartoons with her. But to no avail, because although the judge says the
separation will not be good for Dani, it also will not cause detriment
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either. Even if the separation did cause detriment, it just does not
outweigh the benefits of adoption.
II. BACKGROUND
A child is a dependent under the court’s jurisdiction if the child
falls within any of the exceptions enumerated within the California
Welfare and Institutions Code. Once jurisdiction has been established, a
hearing is held where the judge decides in a disposition hearing whether
the child will remain in the custody of the parents or enter the foster care
system. Unless “the court finds by clear and convincing evidence” that
the dependency situation falls within one of the seventeen exceptions to
the rule, parents must be provided with services to help them reunite with
the dependent child.1
After the disposition hearing, if the child remains in the custody of
the parents, the dependency status is dismissed. However, if the child is
removed, two hearings are held: the six-month hearing and the twelvemonth hearing.2 Reunification can occur at these hearings depending on
the judge’s subjective determination of the parent’s progress with
services and whether any goals the judge has required are met, such as
completion of rehab or domestic violence classes.3
The six-month hearing requires the child to be returned to the
parent’s custody unless the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the child is still at substantial risk.4 However, the twelvemonth hearing is a permanency hearing meant to determine the
permanent plan for the dependent child.5 “If the child is not returned to a
parent . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held pursuant to section
366.26 in order to determine whether adoption, or . . . another planned
permanent living arrangement is the most appropriate plan for the
child.”6 This hearing is referred to colloquially as the “Two-Six” hearing,
due to the statute section requiring the hearing.7
At these hearings, including the “Two-Six,” the court must return
the child to the custody of the parents unless “the return of the child to
his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5(b)(1-17) (Deering 2020).
See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.21(e)(1); 366.21(f)(1) (Deering 2020).
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.25(a)(1) (Deering 2020).
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.21(e)(1) (Deering 2020).
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 3616.21(f)(1) (Deering 2020).
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.25(a)(3) (Deering 2020).
See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26 (Deering 2020).
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the child.”8 “The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that
detriment.”9 If after the Two-Six hearing the court is still unable to
reunite the parent with the child, parental rights will be terminated, and a
permanent plan will be determined.10
“Adoption . . . is the permanent plan preferred by the legislature.”11
However, the Agency must show “by a clear and convincing standard,
that it is likely the child will be adopted.”12 “If the court finds a minor
cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if
parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent
plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the minor under one of five specified exceptions;”13 one of which is the
sibling exception.14
The sibling exception provides that if “[t]here would be substantial
interference with a child’s sibling relationship,” the court shall not
terminate parental rights.15 “To show a substantial interference with a
sibling relationship, the parent must show the existence of a significant
sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the
child.”16 To determine whether interference would be substantial, the
court should consider:
[T]he nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not
limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same
home, whether the child shared significant common experiences
or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether
ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the
child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit
of legal permanence through adoption.17

If, and only if, a judge is convinced there is a significant sibling
bond and a substantial interference could occur to that bond due to the
removal which causes a detriment to the dependent, does the judge
8

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.22(a)(1); 366.25(a)(1) (Deering 2020).
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.22(a)(1); 366.25(a)(1) (Deering 2020).
10
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26 (Deering 2020).
11
In re Autumn H., 27 Cal. App. 4th 567, 573 (1994); In re Heather B., 9 Cal. App.
4th 535, 546 (1992).
12
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1) (Deering 2020); see also In re Autumn H.,
27 Cal. App. 4th 567 (1994); In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th 942, 947 (2002).
13
In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th at 947 (citing § 366.26 (c)(1)); In re Jamie R., 90
Cal. App. 4th 766, 773, (2001)).
14
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1) (Deering 2020).
15
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) (Deering 2020).
16
In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th at 952.
17
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) (Deering 2020).
9
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“weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship
against the benefit the child would receive from the permanency of
adoption.”18
Logically, the sibling exception would only be relevant to a child
found to be a dependent under subsection (b) of California Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, like Dani, because the protection from any
physical or mental abuse that rises to the level of the other subsections
will almost certainly outweigh the detriment from interference with the
sibling bond. Subsection (b) states the child can be found to be a
dependent if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of”
neglect by the parent.19 Additionally, if one child is found to be a
dependent under this subsection, but their sibling is not, it is likely due to
an age gap large enough that the children require different amounts of
care and attention, similar to the situation between Dani and Stephen.20
The purpose of the Welfare and Institutions Code for dependent
children “is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who
are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and
physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that
harm.”21 When children are treated poorly or inadequately cared for to
the point that the court considers the child a dependent within the court’s
jurisdiction, it is hard to justify any exception to removing the child from
their parents’ custody. It is hard to justify leaving the child to be abused
or neglected because no child deserves to be treated in that manner. If an
exception to the termination of parental rights, such as the sibling
exception, were to unequivocally undermine the purpose of the chapter,
it would be counterproductive.
The sibling exception does not undermine the purpose of the
chapter. Although separation has several benefits, “the most obvious
being the immediate safety of the child,”22 separation can have
“profound [detrimental] effect[s] on [children],” as well.23 Currently, the
18

In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th at 952 (citing § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v)).
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(b)(1) (Deering 2020).
20
These distinctions do not affect the analysis or recommendations contained herein.
21
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300.2 (Deering 2020).
22
Practice Notes for North Carolina’s Child Welfare Workers, Child. Serv.,
http://www.practicenotes.org/vol2_no4/cspnv2_4.pdf , (last visited July 3, 2018)
23
Sarah Farnsworth, Children Separated from Siblings in Foster Care Feel
‘Powerless, Anxious’, CREATE Foundation Study Finds, ABCNEWS, (June 14,
2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-15/children-separated-from-siblings-infoster-care-feel-powerless/6546110.
19
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judge must decide whether the benefits of separation outweigh the
detriment. Since the judge is the sole finder of fact in these cases, judicial
bias can affect the decision.
Proponents of the current system will argue that, in many cases,
eliminating this judicial bias from the determination of detriment may
not change the outcome of removal due to the overwhelming need to
separate the child from their parents. Neglectful parenting, for example,
can cause an internal struggle of “self-worth and value.”24 Further, both
“abuse and neglect have an adverse effect on children’s brain
development.”25 Traumatic “experiences alter the functioning of an adult
brain . . . [but] abuse and neglect can impact a child’s emotional
development” and alter their brain’s framework.26 Abuse can have
mental and emotional effects, but the “[p]hysical consequences range
from minor injuries to severe brain damage and even death.”27 Although
abuse is “the most damaging . . . [i]gnoring or neglecting a child’s needs
can create . . . mental health problems,” as well.28
However, this Article does not argue that all, or even that a
significant amount of dependency proceedings involving the sibling
exception, are incorrect. Nor does this Article argue the sibling exception
should be given more weight than adoption. It argues that the sibling
relationship should be given a just amount of weight to further the true
purpose of dependency: to find the best option for the child and “not
disrupt the family unnecessarily or intrude inappropriately into family
life.”29
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The current system for determining if and how the sibling exception
applies is problematic in multiple ways. The system is riddled with the
potential for (A) bias from judges, expert witnesses, and others involved
in the proceedings; (B) improper weighing of facts and arguments; and
(C) improper use of facts, making the current process inadequate to

24

Karyl McBride, Ph.D., The Long-Term Impact of Neglectful Parents: The Lifelong
Effects
of
Childhood
Neglect,
Psych.
Today
(Aug.
21,
2017),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-legacy-distorted-love/201708/the-longterm-impact-neglectful-parents.
25
McBride, supra note 24.
26
McBride, supra note 24.
27
National Research Council, Understanding Child Abuse and Neglect, 208 (Nat’l
Academies Press eds., 1993), https://www.nap.edu/read/2117/chapter/6.
28
McBride, supra note 24.
29
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300 (Deering 2020).
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further the purpose of dependency law when evaluating the sibling
exception.
A. Bias
Everything is affected by some bias, even if it is only unconscious
experiential bias. It is because of bias that nearly all trials provide the
option of having a jury. During dependency trials, however, this bias is
not mitigated in any way, which needs to change.
Bias does not necessarily carry the colloquial negative connotation
involving ‘prejudice,’ it just requires preference. “Bias is a tendency to
prefer one person or thing to another, and to favor that person or thing.”30
There are multiple kinds of bias,31 “[b]ut experiential bias is inescapable,
affecting everyone who’s ever had an experience.”32 “‘[E]xperiential bias
is largely self-evident; people make decisions based on what they have
learned from their experiences.”33 There are three types of bias that occur
in adversarial settings: “(1) conscious bias, (2) unconscious bias, and (3)
selection bias.”34 Experiential bias is typically an unconscious bias.
Unconscious bias includes confirmation bias—which causes “people to
pay more attention to information that confirms their existing belief
system and disregard that which is contradictory.”35 Experts believe that
the mind’s subconscious is responsible for eighty percent or more of the
thought processes,36 thereby making it difficult to escape unconscious
bias.
1. Judicial Bias
The courts are split as to whether the ending of the sibling
relationship would cause detriment. The lack of consistent outcomes in
cases with similar facts (and even inconsistent opinions about the same
facts such as the In re L.Y.L. case discussed below) shows the system’s
need for change. The courts in the following two cases examine the same

30

Bias, Collins English Dictionary (10th ed. 2010).
See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial)
Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 451, 454 (2007) (discussing the types
of bias); see also Sharon E. Rush, Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article III Judges:
Geography, Identity, and Bias, 79 Mo. L. Rev. 119 (2014); Kathleen Nalty, Strategies for
Confronting Unconscious Bias, 45 Colo. Law. 45 (2016).
32
Rush, supra note 31.
33
Rush, supra note 31.
34
Bernstein, supra note 31.
35
Nalty, supra note 31.
36
Nalty, supra note 31.
31
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child and relationship but have different ideas as to how the sibling
exception applied.
The trial court in In re L.Y.L. (hereinafter “L.Y.L.”) found that the
sibling exception did not apply, and the appellate court affirmed.37 The
court ruled L.Y., a four-year-old, and J.R., the younger brother, were
dependents under section 300(b) and removed them from L., the
mother.38 In the trial court, the social worker said, “L.Y. loved J.R. and
they were very close. L.Y. said she would be sad if J.R. lived with L. and
would miss him and worry about his safety. L.Y. and J.R had a
relationship and had lived together most of their lives.”39 Aside from
“being sad”, the court found “no evidence that L.Y. . . .would suffer
detriment if the relationship ended.”40 Due to the inability of this child to
express her feelings any more accurately than “sad,” the court concluded
that the mother had “not sustained her burden of proof that termination of
her parental rights to L.Y. would substantially interfere with L.Y.’s
sibling relationship with J.R.”41 However, the court continued with the
analysis and went on to find that “[v]aluing L.Y.’s continuing
relationship with J.R. over adoption would deprive her of the ability to
belong to a family, which is not in her best interests.”42 More
specifically, it concluded that “[i]f parental rights are terminated here,
L.Y. gains a permanent home through adoption …” so “the benefits of
adoption outweighed the benefits of the [sic] continuing L.Y.’s
relationship with J.R., even if it be assumed [sic] that termination of
parental rights would result in a substantial interference with the sibling
relationship.”43
The court in In re Jacob S. (hereinafter “Jacob S.”) disagreed with
the conclusion the court came to in L.Y.L.44 The Jacob S. court “[found]
In re L.Y.L., instructive to a point.”45 However, it concluded L.Y.L. was
wrong in “that a child’s ‘sadness’ can never satisfy the substantial
detriment test.”46 The Jacob S. court reasoned that “‘[s]adness’ is often
all a young child can express.”47 An adult would say “‘[t]his will make
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th 942, 947 (2002).
Id. at 946.
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 953.
In re L.Y.L., 101 Cal. App. 4th 942, 953 (2002).
In re Jacob S., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1011, 1017 (2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.

2021] The True Detriment of Sibling Separation Lies in the Law

87

me sad, but I can deal with it,’ or, they can say ‘[t]his will devastate me;
I can’t imagine life without my sibling and I don’t think I want to live
without him or her,’ [whereas] a child is likely to describe both as
making him, ‘sad.’”48 The court concluded that sadness can “satisfy the
substantial detriment test.”49
Both courts looked at L.Y.’s situation, and one found that ‘sadness’
was not enough. In contrast, the other court determined that just because
a child cannot articulate feelings in any other way than “sadness,” a
finding of detriment is not precluded.
These differences in analysis and conclusions seem to come from
either a misunderstanding of child psychology or judicial bias. Even if
the argument is made that the differences are simply explained by
differing interpretations of laws or facts, the interpretation is affected by
unconscious experiential bias at a minimum. It is obvious why a judge
with bias deciding anything, let alone a child’s future, is a problem, but
even if the differences are due to a misunderstanding rather than bias, it
is still a problem because a judge who does not understand child
psychology should not decide whether one option would be more
detrimental or beneficial to a child.
Specifically, the bias here is likely the type of unconscious
experiential bias known as “confirmation bias,” which causes a judge to
conclude quickly and then search for facts and evidence to support that
conclusion. But experiential bias can also be conscious when a judge
interposes personal thoughts or preferences about growing up. These
differing decisions could be the result of opinions regarding the
importance of siblings or a true sibling relationship.
The criteria for determining a “substantial interference” is
subjective and allows a fact finder to mold the determination to its own
beliefs with little restraint. The purpose of voir dire is to flush out bias
from the jury. It is common knowledge that a jury of multiple people is
selected for factual determinations to mitigate the experiential and
unconscious bias from individual jurors such as “reasonable,”
“substantial,” “detrimental,” or other similar terms. But here, a single
judge determines whether the interference is “substantial” or if the
dependent child suffered “detriment.” Then, the judge, who has not seen
or has hardly seen the children interact and knows nothing else but the
words that have been spoken to them from the parties about the situation,
decides whether that detriment outweighs the benefits of the permanency
48
49

Id.
Id.
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of adoption for that child. There are no mechanisms in the current sibling
exception determinations to flush out bias from a judge.
In some situations, “court-ordered sibling bond studies may be
appropriate.”50 Proponents of the current system would likely argue this
mechanism mitigates the judicial bias by providing neutral expert
analysis. But this is not an adequate solution for a few reasons. For
example, “the juvenile court [does] not have a sua sponte duty to
consider the sibling relationship exception.”51 Second, if the sibling
exception is not raised in the trial court, not only will it not be considered
sua sponte, but “failure to raise the exception at the section 366.26
hearing forfeits the issue for purposes of appeal.”52
Additionally, court-ordered sibling bond studies do not solve the
issue if the studies are not done in every applicable case, mainly because
“in dependency matters . . . ‘considerations such as permanency and
stability are of paramount importance.’”53 Placement for adoption or
preventing the termination of parental rights to continue a sibling
relationship is a question of permanency and stability. If court-ordered
sibling bond studies were a valid counter-argument, the bias of the judge
in determining which cases deserve a study would need to be flushed out
by providing a study for each case in which a study is applicable
regardless of whether the judge thinks it should be provided. Otherwise,
the sibling bond studies are still used at the whim of the judge, subject
directly to the judge’s bias. If a study was completed for each applicable
case, then the sibling bond study would be mandatory, not court-ordered,
and would solve the issue.
The following two hypotheticals show how profoundly experiential
bias may affect dependency proceedings. Each judge’s experiences could
vary widely and unfairly prejudice the determination of what is best for
the child. Situation A: The judge is an only child who never knew what it
meant to have a sibling. The closest thing this judge had were friends,
which the judge would only have what amounts to ‘visitation.’ To the
judge in situation A, not living with your sibling and only visiting does
not appear to affect the sibling bond because that’s all the judge had ever
known, and he found was still close with his friends regardless. But what
he doesn’t understand is the difference in the closeness of those
friendships and a sibling relationship. How could he or she know? The
relationship between siblings is unique and is difficult to explain or
50
51
52
53

In re Jacob S., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1011, 1018 (2002).
In re Daisy D., 144 Cal. App. 4th 287, 292 (2006).
Id.
Id. (citing In re S.B. 32 Cal. 4th 1287, 1293 (2004)).
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articulate. In all likelihood, this judge cannot even imagine what it’s like
to have a sibling, let alone compare the detriment of losing that sibling to
what benefit the child may gain in adoption, depending on if the family
the child ends up with is even a good one.
Situation B: a second judge is a twin. This judge would be very
close to the sibling and could not imagine separation. The two were
confused by other people while growing up, liked all the same things,
and finished each other’s sentences. The twins were on all the same
sports teams, had the same group of friends, and shared clothes. To this
judge, living, growing, and teaching each other is everything to the
sibling bond, which would be impossible to foster with only visitation.
These two judges could look at the same case and arrive at the complete
opposite determination—and neither one may be correct. Ultimately,
judges are left with vast discretion in dependency cases by acting as the
presiding judge and the fact finder. This allows the experiences of the
judge to taint their view of the situation whether by conscious or
unconscious avenues.
2. Social Worker Bias
Social workers in dependency cases are not independent. Social
workers are employed by the Department of Children and Family
Services (“DCFS”). DCFS workers detain the children, file petitions to
remove, develop their allegations, provide services, and investigate the
parents.54 These social workers essentially work against the parents.
They are the people who initiate the proceedings and recommend
removal from the parents. There may be no one more biased towards the
termination of parental rights in a dependency proceeding than the social
workers.
In a dependency proceeding, social workers are acting as both an
arresting officer and district attorney (“DA”) would in a criminal
matter—two instances in which no one would argue that the DA or
arresting officer is not biased. Arresting officers initially bring the matter
into the system and recommend the initiation of proceedings just like the
social worker petitions for the court to take jurisdiction and DA’s have
the burden of proving guilt just like the social worker has the burden of
proving the child will be at risk if returned.
Social workers are the prosecutors and arresting officers of
dependency proceedings. The inherent bias of a social worker’s opinion
makes their report regarding the sibling exception not entirely credible.
54

See In re Naomi P., 132 Cal. App. 4th 808, 812 (2005).
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The potential likelihood for an education and experience gap and bias
makes the social workers’ reports an inadequate evaluation of the sibling
exception for the court.
3. Expert Bias
Sometimes attorneys hire experts to testify regarding the sibling
relationship, the detriment to the child of being separated from their
sibling, or other things regarding the exception, but experts are paid to
appear on a client’s behalf just like an attorney. No reasonable person
would ever disagree that an attorney is biased towards the side they are
paid by; in fact, attorneys are essentially required to be biased.55 Even if
they were not, attorneys are biased toward the party paying them because
that is how they make their living. Just the same, that is how experts
make their living. Therefore, experts are generally inherently biased.
There are three main types of expert bias that occur in adversarial
settings: “(1) conscious bias, (2) unconscious bias, and (3) selection
bias.”56 “[C]onscious bias arises when ‘hired guns’ adapt their opinions
to the needs of the attorney who hires them.”57 However, the most
prevalent bias in this situation is likely unconscious bias. “As Sir George
Jessel pointed out in an English judicial opinion over a century ago,
‘[u]ndoubtedly there is a natural bias to do something serviceable for
those who employ you and adequately remunerate you.’”58
Hired experts are biased towards the hiring party. For example,
forensic experts often have a desire to “reach conclusions that assist the
prosecution,” because “prosecutors are often responsible for evaluating
forensic scientists’ performances.”59 Similarly, attorneys who hire
experts evaluate them and decide whether to hire the expert or refer other
attorneys to the expert in the future. These hired experts would risk
future employment if their testimony did not assist the party who hired
them. The experts depend on having future work; it is how they pay the
bills.
Often there is another expert with equivalent qualifications on the
other side of an issue supporting the opposite conclusion due to this same
“hired-gun” bias. Therefore, as most judges and attorneys know, a judge
cannot take what an expert testifies to as the truth due to these types of
loyalty biases. Additionally, the view that there is one expert on each
55
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57
58
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side of the issue is the third type of bias: selection bias. 60 This type of
bias misleads the judge (or in other cases jury) into thinking there is a
split in expert opinion about a subject. A case could be about whether
gravity is in fact real with an expert on each side; one saying it is real,
and the other disagreeing. The truth is there could be one million experts
in the world that agree gravity is real and only one that does not. The
attorney opposing gravity searched and found the only expert to support
them. Therefore, hired experts bring too much bias with them to resolve
the issue of bias and educational inadequacy in the child psychology of
judges.
B. Improper Weighing of Facts and Arguments
1. Comments and Testimony by Dependents
It is common knowledge that, generally, children do not have the
necessary experiences to express emotions completely and accurately
because they have not matured to the point where they understand their
feelings or how the consequences of their choices will affect them in the
future.61 Emotional competence requires many skills62 which children
have not had the necessary experience or lifespan to develop. “Children
have to learn these expressive strategies.”63 As a result, what children
desire and what is best for them do not always line us64—in fact, they
usually do not. These are major reasons that minors’ attorneys are
charged with advocating not only what the child desires but also what is
best for the child, even if it diverges from the aforementioned desires.
A child’s ignorance of the consequences of their choices is the
primary reason the legislature places age requirements on voting and the
purchasing of controlled substances like alcohol, tobacco, and
marijuana.65 Furthermore, children are unable to compare the long-term
60
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consequences of their present choices to the short-term benefits, or in
some cases, even foresee those consequences.66 It is not an uncommon
story for children to try to run away from home because they are upset at
their parents for something such as taking away a video game. If children
could understand the long-term effects of their choices, no child would
run away. The child would realize without the parents, the child would
not have the video game, and even if the child did, the game is worthless
without electricity or the family television.
Given children’s lack of emotional intelligence and understanding
of consequences, minors are appointed counsel by the court in
dependency proceedings67 whereas adults are allowed to proceed pro se
in court. The court may only refuse to appoint counsel in dependency
proceedings if the child “would not benefit from the appointment of
counsel,”68 but “the court has a nondiscretionary duty to at least consider
the appointment.”69 Generally, children are not mature or intelligent
enough to properly conduct or advocate for themselves. Hence the lower
standard of care for children in tort law70 and their right to revoke in
contract law.71
All of these laws and regulations evidence that judges must know
children cannot accurately express how meaningful a relationship is to
them whether it be because they may be incapable of expressing
emotions intelligently or do not understand their own emotions enough to
know how important a relationship is or will be in the future. Yet, in
addition to the judicial bias evidenced in L.Y.L. and Jacob S above, these
cases also show improper use of these types of rash statements made by
emotional children.
The court in Jacob S. took jurisdiction over the mother’s “five
children—Jessica, age [fourteen;] Autumn, age [eleven;] Noah, age
[nine;] Jacob, age [six;] and Matthew, age [three]”—under § 300(b)72
when the mother “checked herself into a hospital for mental health
treatment without first assuring adequate supervision for Noah, who is a
quadriplegic and requires around-the-clock care, . . . because [the mother
was] not adequately trained to care for [Noah]” which “created a
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dangerous situation.”73 Jacob showed a clear desire to live with his
siblings and Autumn said that Jessica was “bossy and grumpy,” and she
“was angry with Jessica and did not want to see her,” even though
Autumn “clearly wanted to maintain relationships with [her] siblings.”74
Autumn and Jessica were close in age and “used to work together to take
care of their brothers, performing such tasks as cooking for them and
changing their diapers.”75 The court concluded that Autumn would suffer
a detriment if her sibling relationship with Jessica ended, but that the
sibling exception did not apply to Jacob.
The court in Jacob S. hardly mentioned Jacob’s apparent desire to
live with his siblings in determining the balance between the detriment of
separation and “the benefits of adoption,”76 and did not allow Autumn’s
rash comments to affect its opinion about the effects of the interference
with her sibling relationship would have upon her. In L.Y.L., on the other
hand, the court relied on the fact that L.Y. “wanted to be adopted even if
that ended her relationship with [her sibling].”77 The judge in L.Y.L.
accepted L.Y.’s portrayal of her feelings as true and accurate, and even
relied on it in the disposition of the case. These differences in theory of
how to handle the children’s comments about what they want can be
explained by either a lack of understanding of how children act and
express themselves or by confirmation bias: judges looking for the
evidence that supports the outcome the judge subconsciously desires.78
C. Continued Visitation Does Not Eliminate Interference with the
Relationship
Courts, social workers, and minors’ counsel sometimes argue that
post-adoption visitation is sufficient to remove interference with the
sibling bond because the children are still given the opportunity to
interact and stay in touch with their siblings.79 These agencies argue the
brief visits with which separated siblings are provided allow the children
adequate time to maintain the sibling relationship. They claim that once a
week for a few hours after school does not interfere with a relationship—
a relationship that used to mean seeing each other every morning and
evening, and sharing multiple meals per day with each other, such as
73
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breakfast and dinner. This amount of time established by the court is
inadequate at best.
“Sibling relationships help children achieve developmental
milestones as well as provide emotional support, companionship, and
comfort.”80 In a sibling relationship, one sibling’s problems are the other
sibling’s problems as well. The siblings work together to solve their
issues, and they grow together. It is being able to count on the person
based on the bond created through hard times and good times. Children
“use their [sibling] relationships to understand who they are;”81 and those
siblings “remain important figures throughout [the children’s] lives.”82
Furthermore, “research indicates that biological relatedness is not
associated with young children’s perceptions of closeness to siblings;
being a full, half, or step-sibling did not influence their perception of
closeness.”83 Therefore, post-adoption visitation transforms the sibling
relationship into a friendship because children do not recognize
biological relatedness; rather, they see the relationship at face value.
If a child visits their sibling, as one would visit a friend, the child is
viewed as a friend regardless of DNA. The strength of the sibling bond
does not come from simply knowing a biological sibling but living with
the person and sharing experiences with that person. It lies with growing
up day by day with that person—not just the limited experiences that
come with friendship. The sibling bond cannot be maintained and
protected if it is not a sibling relationship. Therefore, post-adoption
visitation with a biological sibling is inadequate to maintain the sibling
relationship and minimizes interference with the sibling bond.
Currently, “[t]here are no statutes providing the juvenile court with
authority to grant dependents the right to visit with nondependent
siblings.”84 In In re Luke H., for example, the court obtained jurisdiction
over Luke under section 300(c).85 The “[m]other refused to allow
visitation between Luke and [his sister],” so Luke filed a petition to
modify the orders to allow visitation.86 However, “[t]he juvenile court’s
jurisdiction over mother (the sister’s custodial parent) does not provide
80
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the court the adequate power to grant that request. What matters is that
the juvenile court had no statutory authority to enter a visitation order
regarding [the sister,] a nondependent sibling.”87 “[W]hile the
subdivision authorized Luke, a dependent child, to file a petition to
change a court order, it did not authorize the juvenile court to issue an
order affecting a child outside the court’s jurisdiction.”88 This is the
typical sibling situation when the sibling exception would have any
applicable value: one or more dependent children and at least one nondependent.89 Thus, the court cannot mitigate the effects of separation and
foster the development of the sibling relationship because it cannot grant
visitation.90
D. Unenforceable Promises of a Commitment to Visitation Cannot Show
a Lack of Interference
The trial court in In re D.O. (hereinafter “D.O.”), “explained that
the sibling relationship exception ‘really only comes into the light . . . if
there is a demonstrated interference’ with such a relationship.”91 The trial
court found, and the appellate court agreed, that the paternal grandmother
“would [not] in any way interfere” with the sibling relationship due to
the “paternal grandmother’s proven track record of facilitating visits with
D.O. and the Siblings.”92 The trial court essentially found that the sibling
exception did not apply to D.O. because “there [was] absolutely no
evidence that the bond would be interfered with” based (at least partially
if not relying completely) on93 the promises of the currently-monitored
caregivers. The appellate court held that the determination cannot
exclusively rely on the commitment of caregivers to visitation,94 yet
many courts find that promises preclude interference with the bond
because the siblings will have continued visitation,95 or at least use it as
support of the finding as the court did here. 96
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Courts often accept caregivers’ promises of a commitment to
visitation between siblings due to their lack of authority to force
visitation. However, these promises are unenforceable and speculative at
best. Courts recognize that they “would not be able to compel the
prospective adoptive parents to maintain contact with the remaining
sibling.”97 These courts cannot order the visitation regardless of whether
a party has promised the visitation on its own or not. Furthermore, even
if the court had the power to force visitation while it had jurisdiction over
the case, these caregivers will not be subject to the power of the court
once the adoption process has been completed. Once they have adopted
the child, it is their discretion that controls what is best for the child,
including visitation with a sibling.
The adoptive caregiver’s “track record” will show a commitment to
the facilitation of visits, however, the “track record” is not an honest
intimation of future commitment. The caregiver needs the backing of the
agency to be able to adopt the child. The child is currently a dependent
and under the jurisdiction of the court, so the caregivers are being
scrutinized as much as the parents. The caregivers will act exemplary
when there are consequences for their malperformance, but this does not
say much for how they will act once the adoption is complete. If it was
an adequate indicator, would former dependents ever be molested by
adoptive parents?
E. Testimony and Reports by Social Workers
When a sibling relationship is at issue in a case, social workers
typically provide their opinion on the strength of the relationship and
whether that bond could “qualify as a sibling exception to adoption under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E).”98 In order to obtain the job, these
social workers must at minimum obtain a bachelor’s in social work,99
and once they do receive it, they exclusively deal with dependent or
troubled youth. However, these social workers are nowhere near experts
on sibling relationships or detriment; specifically, they are not therapists.
The education requirements to be employed as a therapist are much more

97

See, e.g., In re D.B., No. C043732, 2003 WL 22683387, at 6 (Cal. App. 3 Dist.,
Nov. 14, 2003).
98

In re A.M., No. E035137, 2004 WL 1776581, at 2 (Aug. 10, 2004)
California Social Work Licensing Requirements, Social Work Guide (2018),
https://www.socialworkguide.org/licensure/california/.
99

2021] The True Detriment of Sibling Separation Lies in the Law

97

robust.100 A therapist must have a bachelor’s degree and master’s degree
at a minimum, plus thousands of hours of supervised experience.101
Additionally, a therapist must pass both the California Law and Ethics
Exam (“LMLE”) and the Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist
clinical exam (“LMCE”).102 A social worker’s knowledge and education
in this area are not adequate compared to a licensed therapist’s; therefore,
their evaluations of the sibling bond, the interference caused by
separation, and the detriment caused by termination cannot be substituted
for a licensed therapist’s.
F. Attorney Reliance
Proponents of the current system may argue that attorneys must
properly advocate for their clients, so judges can rely on attorneys
litigation skills to ensure they have the necessary information to rule on a
case. The idea is that each attorney will seek out and provide the best
argument for their client, leading the judge to the fairest solution. But,
for the most part, no attorney has specialized knowledge or education in
the psychological development of children in general, let alone the
effects of sibling relationships or bonds, which means they are inept in
the psychological effects of separation. An attorney has a law degree and
is not required to have a Bachelor of Arts in psychology or child
development, or a master’s in the like. There are cases where attorneys
fail to either object to a “decision [an expert knows] would exacerbate, if
not cause, child abuse and additional trauma” to the child or to “advocate
in court for an expert witness to provide information” regarding the
separation.103 Ultimately, attorneys’ ideas and opinions are not sufficient
to provide the most adequate arguments when it comes to sibling
relationships.
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G. Improper Use of Facts
1. Age is not a Meaningful Factor
Many courts conclude that the sibling exception does not apply due
to the age of the dependent child. When the dependent child is younger,
the “experiences the children shared with [the older sibling] would not be
as meaningful to them . . . as the experiences were to [the older
sibling].”104 This is not an unusual mistake, in fact, “many people assume
that very young children are not affected at all, erroneously believing that
they are too young to know or remember what has happened. However,
even in the earliest phases of infant and toddler development, clear
associations have been found between exposure to violence and posttraumatic symptoms and disorders.”105
“Behavioral problems of childhood . . . typically emerge in the
early years and are associated with deficits in social skills, emotional
regulation, frustration tolerance, and social problem solving.”106 “The
preschool years are a key developmental period in which skills essential
for later academic and social success are acquired and honed.”107
“Because of the very rapid and complex changes during the first three
years of life, developmental factors will influence the young child’s
perception and experience of the trauma associated with violence.”108 “In
a recent study . . . clear evidence emerged of PTSD symptoms in children
under the age of four years.”109
The use of a child’s young age as a factor lessening the detriment
caused by separation is either an excuse to give the sibling relationship
less weight due to bias or an uninformed analysis. Age does not affect
nor decrease a child’s response to the trauma experienced due to
violence; it actually increases the detriment, so it is unwise to assume a
child’s age affects the response to any other traumatic experiences in any
other way. The children may not remember those experiences through
memories and words, but those experiences give children of all ages
subconscious knowledge of trust and attachment. To have those
104
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relationships ripped out from under them may result in long-term effects
the child does not—and may never—understand, thus, the lack of
understanding does not equate with a lack of detriment.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Neutral, Third-Party Expert
Dependents deserve to have an objective, independent expert
determine what constitutes substantial interference.110 Children are our
future, and their cognitive and mental capacities should be given the
utmost care. The policy behind dependency and adoption is to do what is
best for the child. If what is best for the child varies from judge to judge,
which court’s conclusion, if any, is actually best for the child?
Dependent children deserve to have the best choice for their future
made whether or not the attorneys put the sibling exception at issue. One
of the main benefits of adoption is the ability for the child to become part
of a family, but a child who has everything ripped away from them may
never have stability in relationships. Thus, these children may never feel
a like or want to be part of the family, thereby nullifying this benefit.
Tearing away everything children care about will cause the children to
prevent themselves from becoming attached in the future to protect
themselves from the same scenario, causing the main benefit of adoption
to be void. A neutral, third-party therapeutic or psychological expert
must evaluate each situation in order to provide the child with the best
solution to the issues at hand, leading to the dependency finding.
An objective analysis will allow for more consistent rulings which
will provide data as to whether the choices are the best ones for the
children. Child psychologists or therapists that are familiar with foster
youth should evaluate the strength of the sibling bonds and the detriment
that would result from the termination of parental rights and advise the
court.
B. Fair Balancing
As discussed previously, the current balancing equation used fails
to include an essential aspect of the sibling relationship in addition to the
detriment of losing their parents. The current system balances the
benefits of adoption with the detriment caused by the removal, but it
does not address the loss of benefits that the siblings would gain as they
110
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grow and live together; nor does it include the detriment caused by
separation from the parents.
Separation of a child from a parent who is the primary caregiver
can cause an “intense, fear-based rage felt inside the [child].”111 Based on
what is known “about child development, the brain, and trauma,” it is
clear children “grow up with the shrapnel of this traumatic experience
embedded in their minds.”112 In fact, children “separated from their
parents at a young age had much less white matter . . . as well as much
less grey matter” in their brain, which is required to transmit and process
information.113 This often results in “delinquency, attention-deficits,
shyness, and depression” in the adolescents114 and “interfere[s] with their
ability to maintain stable and enduring love and work relationships” as
adults.115 The CREATE Foundation performed a study and found that
children who are separated from their siblings largely suffer the same
effects.
Children often take siblings for granted when they are together, but
immediately upon separation, they care “more about staying in touch
with their brothers and sisters than their parent.”116; this is because when
children lose a sibling, they “feel ‘they have lost a part of
themselves.’”117 Therefore, when a child is separated from both their
parents and siblings, it “compounds the anxiety and pain they feel over
separation.”118 When a dependent child who had siblings has parental
rights terminated, the internal damage to the child when they are placed
with adoptive parents can be more than twice as much as a child that was
only removed from their parents.
Adoption, as the permanent plan choice, is preferred by the
legislature when the parents are not performing adequately as parents, so
the benefits of adoption outweigh the detriment of separation. But, when
non-dependent siblings are involved, the detriment of losing parents is
taken out of the equation, and the detriment caused by sibling separation
111
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is isolated in the weighing of detriment against adoptive benefits. The
sibling exception implies that the court should ignore any other detriment
in the equation.119
Courts disregard the detriment of losing parents as well as the
opportunity costs of not allowing the sibling bond/relationship to grow
and develop; yet, it is weighed against the benefits of adoption which is
inherently all-inclusive of the inverses of those detriments discussed
above. The main benefit of adoption would be to remove the child from
the neglectful or abusive household and provide the child with adoptive
parents that are both supportive and nurturing. The effects on the child
are compounded when the child loses both its parents and siblings, and
that total detriment must be weighed against the benefits of adoption.
On top of ignoring any additional detriment to the dependent child,
the sibling exception “contains strong language creating a heavy burden
for the party opposing adoption.”120 The statute requires that the court
find “a ‘compelling reason’ for concluding that the termination of
parental rights would be ‘detrimental’ to the child due to ‘substantial
interference’ with a sibling relationship.”121 It requires a number of factbased determinations that all have a high standard of evidence. There
must be a significant sibling bond. The termination of parental rights
must cause a substantial interference. The interference must be
detrimental to the dependent child. The detriment must be so harmful
that it must outweigh the benefits of the permanency of adoption and
create a compelling reason to halt the termination of parental rights.
Between the isolation of the detriment and the high standard of evidence,
the sibling bond is not given a fair chance in the evaluation.
Sibling relationships can be an important avenue of maturity and
growth for children. “The relationships people share with siblings are
often the longest-lasting relationships they will have. Siblings are there
from the beginning, and they are often still around after parents, and even
spouses and children, are gone.”122 The loss of that relationship will not
only cost the child more than the present detriment but what they could
have gained in the future from it. So, if a court can speculate how much
harm a child would suffer by remaining with the parent(s), it can and
should speculate what benefits would be lost by terminating the sibling
119

See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) (Deering 2020) (“whether
ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest … as compared to the benefit of legal
permanence through adoption.”).
120
In re Daniel H., 99 Cal App. 4th 804, 813 (2002).
121
Id.; see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) (Deering 2020).
122
Kernan, supra note 80.

102

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

relationship. Thus, these independent experts should not only consider
the loss a child would suffer from separation from the sibling, but also
the opportunity costs of not building upon that relationship in the future
and the losses caused by separation from the parents.
V. CONCLUSION
The system as it currently exists is not properly formulated to
provide a fair and accurate evaluation of the sibling exception. The
purpose of dependency proceedings is to provide the child with
permanent placement that will be the best choice for the child’s future.
Currently, the system does not place that purpose at the forefront of its
workings. The evaluation of the exception is inundated with bias.
Further, through the determination of multiple elements, the final
decision of whether the sibling exception applies is made by a single
judge who, more than likely, has no hint of education regarding the
psychological effects of separation or adoption on children.
Recommendations are made to the court regarding the applicability of
the sibling exception by the social worker who is the same party that
filed the petition to remove the children from the parents’ care in the first
place.
Attorneys are left to make arguments that affect the future of this
child and our country but, similar to judges, they do not have the
adequate education to recognize and evaluate the most beneficial
arguments. Furthermore, the use of experts to aid the attorneys in this
task is unhelpful because the reports are not credible. Experts are known
to have conscious and unconscious bias affecting their position on the
issue; therefore, the court cannot accept the reports at face value. The
sibling exception should be considered in every case in which it is
applicable to ensure that the most beneficial choice for the child’s future
is made. That choice cannot ignore the opportunity costs involved in the
termination of parental rights due to the deterioration of the sibling
relationship.
There is much to gain for children by having a true sibling bond.
Sibling relationships are important to a child’s development, so the
prospective benefits they would gain by continuing that relationship in
full force must be considered in the determination of relative weights of
detriment and benefits of reunification or termination. By combining the
separation from a sibling and separation from parents, a child’s
development is so greatly impacted that an independent, third-party
expert must aid the court in every applicable determination to ensure the
best choice is made for the child’s future. Therefore, the system needs to
use the balancing equation to consider both the detriment and the loss of
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beneficial experiences that result from the ending of the sibling
relationship through termination of parental rights; thus, the court could
better ensure the best choice for the child’s future.

